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RESUMEN
Efecto-riqueza durante las Colo-
caciones Públicas Iniciales Pri-
vatizadoras en Chile (1984-1989)
Se estudia el desempeño posterior a 
ODFRORFDFLyQGHRQFH2IHUWDV3~EOLFDV
,QLFLDOHV 23,V HQ&KLOH GXUDQWH
1984-1989 y se proporciona una des-
cripción detallada de las condiciones 
económicas y políticas prevalecien-
tes. En particular, se presentan los 
detalles operativos del mecanismo 
de emisión de acciones, comple-
mentado con un estudio estadístico 
de los Rendimientos Ajustados por 
HO0HUFDGRGH ODV23,V$XQTXH HO
tamaño de la muestra es limitado y 
no permite alcanzar una validez ex-
WHUQDHODQiOLVLVFRQÀUPDODSUHVHQ-
cia de patrones de desempeño muy 
VLPLODUHV D ORV REVHUYDGRV HQ23,V
tanto privadas como privatizadoras, 
de acuerdo con otros estudios relacio-
nados (Aggarwal, Leal y Hernández, 
1993; Dewenter y Malatesta, 1997; 
Loughran, Ritter y Rydqvist, 1994; 
Perotti y Guney, 1993). 
PALABRAS CLAVE
3ULYDWL]DFLyQVXEYDOXDFLyQGH23,V
desempeño subnormal de largo plazo 
GH23,V
RESUMO
Efeitos de riqueza durante as 
Colocações Públicas Iniciais de 
Privatização no Chile (1984-1989)
Estudamos o desempenho posterior a 
FRORFDomRGH2IHUWDV3~EOLFDV,QLFLDLV
23,VQR&KLOHGXUDQWHH
fornecemos uma descrição detalhada 
das condições econômicas e políticas 
prevalecentes. Em particular, apre-
sentamos os detalhes operacionais 
do mecanismo de emissão de ações, 
complementado por um estudo es-
tatístico dos Rendimentos Ajustados 
SHOR0HUFDGRGDV23,V(PERUDRWD-
manho da demonstração seja limitado 
e não permita alcançar uma validade 
H[WHUQDDDQiOLVHFRQÀUPDDSUHVHQ-
ça de padrões de desempenho muito 
VHPHOKDQWHVDRVREVHUYDGRVHP23,V
tanto privadas como privatizadas, de 
acordo com outros estudos relacio-
nados (Aggarwal, Leal e Hernández, 
1993; Dewenter e Malatesta, 1997; 
Loughran, Ritter e Rydqvist, 1994; 
Perotti e Guney, 1993). 
PALAVRAS CHAVE
Privatização, subvalorização de 23,V, 
desempenho subnormal a longo prazo 
de 23,V.
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INTRODUCTION
3ULYDWL]DWLRQ RI 6WDWH2ZQHG(Q-
WHUSULVHV62(VDFTXLUHGJUHDWUHO-
evance during the 1980s and 1990s in 
both, developed and emerging coun-
tries. The fact that numerous govern-
ments engaged in vast privatization 
programs was a tacit recognition that 
the private sector is better prepared 
to run productive activities.2 
8QGHUVRPHH[WUHPHFLUFXPVWDQFHV
privatization decisions are associated 
to a survival strategy. For example, 
LQ WKH FDVH RI 62(V LPPHUVHG LQ
changing environmental conditions3 
that demand dynamic investment 
efforts and are, at the same time, 
VXEMHFWWROLPLWHGSXEOLFEXGJHWV,Q
many instances, the only sound stra-
WHJLFFKRLFHIRUKDQGLFDSSHG62(VLV
in effect, privatization.
A number of works have documented 
KRZ62(VDUH IUHTXHQWO\ DW D GLV-
advantage when compared with 
SULYDWH ÀUPV LQ WHUPV RI GLIIHUHQW
SHUIRUPDQFHPHDVXUHV 52$52(
productivity, etc.), giving additional 
support to privatization programs. 
Post-privatization performance also 
supports privatization programs and 
has been extensively documented 
(Boardman and Vining, 1989; Bou-
bakri and Cosset, 1998; Boycko, 
Shleifer, and Vishny, 1995; Galal, 
Jones, Tandon and Vogelsang, 1994; 
Megginson, Nash and Van Randen-
borgh, 1994). 
$PRQJRWKHUEHQHÀFLDOFRQVHTXHQFHV
GLIIHUHQWDXWKRUVÀQGWKDWSULYDWL]D-
tion reduces government intervention 
in the economy, along with public 
sector spending when subsidies to 
IUHTXHQWO\LQHIÀFLHQWRSHUDWLRQVDUH
eliminated (e.g., Galal et al., 1994; 
+DFKHWWHDQG/GHUV,QGDFR-
chea, 1993). 
Another collection of studies has 
focused on the price performance of 
SULYDWL]DWLRQ,32·VVKDUHVDQGWKHLU
long-run aftermarket performance 
for both emerging and developed 
markets. Most of those studies re-
SRUW VLJQLÀFDQW VKRUWUXQ SRVLWLYH
returns but disappointing long-term 
SHUIRUPDQFH$IÁHFN*UDYHV+HGJH
and Miller, 1996; Aggarwal, Leal and 
Hernandez, 1993; Benveniste and 
Wilhelm, 1997; Dewenter and Ma-
latesta, 1997; Loughran, Ritter and 
Rydqvist, 1994; Perotti and Guney, 
7KLVDUWLFOH·V FRQWULEXWLRQ WR
WKH SULYDWL]DWLRQ ,32V· OLWHUDWXUH
consists of the detailed analysis of a 
VDPSOHRI&KLOHDQSULYDWL]DWLRQ,32V
during a period that goes from 1985 
to 1989. While the size of the sample 
is limited4 and does not support more 
general conclusions, the inclusion of 
institutional and economic context 
information provides additional 
elements to interpret the observed 
2 Perotti (1991), for example, discusses that under public ownership governments retain unconditional 
control over the use of assets. That discretionary power is costly because it encourages rent-seeking 
EHKDYLRUE\ÀUPLQVLGHUVZKRUHSUHVHQWDPRUHFRRUGLQDWHGLQWHUHVWJURXSWKDQGLVSHUVHGWD[SD\HUV
,QFRQWUDVWSULYDWHRZQHUVKDYHERWKWKHLQFHQWLYHDQGWKHDELOLW\WRFRPPLWWKHLUHIIRUWVLQSXUVXHRI
HIÀFLHQWPDQDJHPHQW
3 These include an increasingly fast globalization of industries and the growing liberalization of national 
economies.
 7KHQXPEHURI&KLOHDQ62(VIRUZKLFKSULYDWL]DWLRQ,32VGXULQJWKHSHULRGFRXOGEHDGHTXDWHO\
documented was of only eleven: C.A.P., Chilgener, Endesa, Entel, Teléfonos, Labchile, Schwager, Elecda, 
Eliqsa, Emelari, and Lanchile.
7XSGOQEVOIX[IEPXLIJJIGXWHYVMRKTVMZEXM^EXMSRMRMXMEPTYFPMGSJJIVWMRCLMPI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short-run underpricing and long-run 
underperformance of Chilean priva-
WL]HGFRPSDQLHV·VKDUHV5 
This article is organized as follows: 
section one reviews existing theories 
RQ,32V·VKRUWUXQXQGHUSULFLQJDQG
long-run underperformance. Section 
two discusses empirical research 
work on private and privatization 
,32V LQ /DWLQ$PHULFD DQG RWKHU
countries. Section three narrates the 
privatization process in Chile from an 
institutional and historical perspec-
tive, emphasizing the economic and 
political implications of using public 
offerings to the general public as a 
mechanism for privatization. Sec-
tion four discusses gradualism on 
the Chilean privatization. Section 
ÀYH SUHVHQWV D VWDWLVWLFDO DQDO\VLV
RQWKHSHUIRUPDQFHRI&KLOHDQ,32V·
shares from 1985 through 1989 and, 
ÀQDOO\VHFWLRQVL[FRQFOXGHVRIIHULQJ
DGGLWLRQDOLQVLJKWVRQWKHXVHRI,32V
as part of the Chilean privatization 
program.
1. TRADITIONAL THEORIES 
ON THE SHORT-RUN 
UNDERPRICING AND LONG-
RUN UNDERPERFORMANCE 
OF IPOs
1.1. Short run underpricing of 
IPOs
Short-run abnormal returns observed 
RQ,32V·VKDUHVKDYHEHHQDQH[WHQ-
sively studied subject. A number of 
studies have documented that short-
run underpricing is not unique to a 
country, and report evidence of its 
international presence (e.g., Celis and 
Maturana, 1998; Dewenter and Ma-
latesta, 1997; Loughran et al., 1994). 
8QGHUSULFLQJ UHSUHVHQWV D SX]]OH
for financial economists because, 
according to the Weak Form of the 
(IÀFLHQW0DUNHWV+\SRWKHVLV(0+
for their abbreviations), observed 
market prices already contain all 
relevant historical information and, 
for that reason, no trading strategy 
based on historical information can 
yield abnormal returns. From that 
SHUVSHFWLYH UHFXUUHQW ,32V· VKRUW
run positive abnormal returns are 
inconsistent with the EMH. 
7RDQ LQYHVWRU ,32V· XQGHUSULFLQJ
represent an opportunity to earn 
extraordinary short-run returns, 
while to the issuer it means leaving 
money on the table. Arbitrage argu-
PHQWVVXJJHVWWKDWLI,32VDUHPRUH
likely to offer extraordinary returns 
compared to other investment alter-
natives, all investors should demand 
them. However, an increased demand 
would result in issuers placing their 
,32VDWKLJKHUSULFHVWKXVUHGXFLQJ
positive abnormal returns until they 
are totally eliminated. 2QWKHVXSSO\
side, similar arguments suggest that 
,32V·LVVXDQFHSULFHVVKRXOGFRQYHUJH
to their economic value, eliminating 
short run underpricing. 
The relative abundance of evidence 
RQ,32V·VKRUWUXQXQGHUSULFLQJGRHV
not necessarily represent a contradic-
tion of the EMH, but shows the need 
 :KLOHWKHSHUIRUPDQFHRI&KLOHDQSULYDWL]DWLRQ,32VZDVVWXGLHGE\$JJDUZDOet al. (1993), as part of 
DQLQWHUQDWLRQDOVWXG\WKLVDUWLFOHDQDO\]HVDGLIIHUHQWVDPSOHRISULYDWL]DWLRQ,32VGLVFXVVHVVHYHUDO
institutional aspects that differentiate the Chilean case from other similar processes, and attempts an 
explanation of the reported short-run underpricing and long-run overpricing of Chilean privatization 
,32VGXULQJWKHSHULRG
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WRGHYHORSDVHQVLEOHH[SODQDWLRQ,Q
that sense, different attempts to give 
DFFRXQWRI ,32V·XQGHUSULFLQJKDYH
been proposed. For example, Tinic 
H[SODLQHG,32V·XQGHUSULFLQJ
LQ WKH8QLWHG 6WDWHV HPSKDVL]LQJ
the role of legal risk. His argument is 
that underwriters take an insurance 
against potential legal liabilities by 
offering unseasoned stock issues at 
a price below their economic value.6
,32V·XQGHUSULFLQJKDVDOVREHHQDV-
VRFLDWHGZLWKLVVXLQJÀUPVsignaling 
their quality (e.g., Allen and Faulha-
ber, 1989; Grinblatt and Yang, 1989; 
Welch, 1992). First time issuers who 
are conscious of the high quality of 
WKHLULVVXHXQGHUSULFH,32VEHFDXVH
that enables them to charge higher 
prices in subsequent stock offers. 
,QIRUPDWLRQ DV\PPHWU\ WKHRULHV
H[SODLQ,32V·XQGHUSULFLQJLQWHUPV
of the existence of differential infor-
mation between market participants. 
Baron (1982) presents a theory of the 
demand for advising and distribu-
tion services based on the existence 
of an asymmetry of information be-
tween the issuer and the investment 
banker. The value to the issuer of 
WKHEDQNHU·VDGYLVLQJDQGGLVWULEX-
tion efforts is an increasing function 
RI WKH LVVXHU·VXQFHUWDLQW\*UHDWHU
uncertainty increases the demand 
for the services of the banker. Since 
the investment banker generates 
demand that may not otherwise ex-
ist by implicitly certifying the qual-
ity of the issue, the issuer lets the 
investment banker to underprice in 
compensation.
A different approach to information 
asymmetry was developed by Rock 
(1986), and suggests that there are 
two kinds of investors: informed 
DQGXQLIRUPHG ,QIRUPHG LQYHVWRUV
VXEVFULEHWR,32VRQO\ZKHQWKH\H[-
pect the after-market price to exceed 
the offering price, while uninformed 
LQYHVWRUV VXEVFULEH WR HYHU\ ,32
LQGLVFULPLQDWHO\ ,Q RUGHU WR NHHS
XQLQIRUPHG LQYHVWRUV LQ WKH ,32
market, investment bankers need to 
RIIHUDOO,32VDWDGLVFRXQWIURPWKHLU
expected after-market price.
/RQJUXQXQGHUSHUIRUPDQFH
of IPOs
A second extensively documented em-
SLULFDO UHJXODULW\REVHUYHG LQ ,32V·
aftermarket performance is their 
ORQJUXQ RYHUSULFLQJ$W ÀUVW VLJKW
this is again a violation of the EMH 
EHFDXVHLI,32V\LHOGOHVVWKDQDYHU-
age long-run returns, investors will 
discriminate against them putting 
downward pressure on their place-
ment prices until equilibrium risk-
adjusted long-run returns prevail. 
Empirical evidence seems to contra-
dict that expectation and leaves open 
a question about the completeness of 
the arbitrage arguments that support 
the EMH. 
While no formal theory that explains 
long-run underperformance predomi-
nates over others, different authors 
DJUHH WKDWZKDWDSSHDUV WREH ,32
 ,QGLVFXVVLQJ7LQLF·VZRUN'UDNHDQG9HWVX\SHQV  IRXQG WKDW ,32V· UHODWHG OLWLJDWLRQDSSHDUV
WREHGULYHQE\ ODUJHVXEVHTXHQWSULFHGHFOLQHV ORQJDIWHU WKH,32DQGQRWE\ZKHWKHUWKH,32ZDV
initially underpriced. However, if investment bankers underprice to avoid legal responsibility in case an 
XQGHUZULWWHQLVVXH·VSHUIRUPDQFHUHVXOWVXQVDWLVIDFWRU\ZHZRXOGH[SHFWWRVHHIHZHUVKRUWUXQFDVHVRI
that nature.
7XSGOQEVOIX[IEPXLIJJIGXWHYVMRKTVMZEXM^EXMSRMRMXMEPTYFPMGSJJIVWMRCLMPI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underpricing in the short-run results, 
in effect, to be long-run overpricing. 
Ritter (1991) studied the performance 
RI  ,32V LQ WKH8QLWHG6WDWHV
during a period that goes from 1975 
to 1984. He found that his sample 
substantially underperformed a 
VDPSOHRIÀUPVPDWFKHGE\VL]HDQG
industry. Calculated from the closing 
SULFHVRQWKHÀUVWGD\RISXEOLFWUDG-
ing to their three-year anniversaries, 
average holding period returns for 
WKH,32VVDPSOHZDV+RZ-
ever, a control sample of 1.526 listed 
stocks, matched by industry and 
market value, produced an average 
total return of 61,86% over the same 
SHULRG&OHDUO\LQWKHORQJUXQ,32V
underperformed.7
2. SHORT-RUN 
UNDERPRICING AND LONG-
RUN UNDERPERFORMANCE 
OF PRIVATE AND 
PRIVATIZATION IPOs IN  
LATIN AMERICA
The short-run underpricing and long-
run underperformance evidence has 
also been documented by interna-
tional studies (e.g., Aggarwal et al., 
1993; Dewenter and Malatesta, 1997; 
Perotti and Guney, 1993).
Aggarwal et al. (1993) studied Latin 
$PHULFDQ,32VGXULQJWKH
period8 and measured the aftermar-
ket performance of Brazilian (62), 
&KLOHDQDQG0H[LFDQ,32V
$UHOHYDQWIHDWXUHRIWKHVHDXWKRUV·
sample was that important priva-
tization programs in which capital 
markets played a significant role 
were included. However, while they 
report the short-run and long-run 
SHUIRUPDQFH RI WKHLU ,32V VDPSOH
for each country, only in the Chilean 
sample do they discriminate private 
YHUVXVSULYDWL]DWLRQ,32V
According to Aggarwal et al. (1993), 
in Panel A of Table 1, day 1 Market 
Adjusted Returns were on average 
7,60% for nine observations. While 
considerably above mean daily re-
WXUQVWKDWYDOXHZDVQRQVLJQLÀFDQW
because of a very large standard 
deviation. However, using the me-
dian value to eliminate the effect of 
extreme observations, the average 
return for one day was -11,70%, sug-
gesting that the method of public 
placements used in Chile reduced 
very short term underpricing, when 
compared to other countries in the 
same study. 
When measured from the closing 
SULFHRQWKHÀUVWWUDGLQJGD\PHDQ
market-adjusted returns of 16,30%, 
11,40% and 8,50%, after one, two and 
three months were reported. Also, in 
the long-run mean market adjusted 
returns calculated with reference to 
the issue price were -29,90%, -11,50% 
and -10,90% for one, two and three 
years, respectively; calculated from 
the closing price on day 1, the corre-
7 Stoll and Curley (1970) focused on 205 small offers, and found that in the short run, the stocks in the 
VDPSOHVKRZHGUHPDUNDEOHSULFHDSSUHFLDWLRQ,EERWVRQXVHGRQHRIIHULQJSHUPRQWKIRUWKHWHQ
\HDUSHULRGDQGFRPSXWHGH[FHVVUHWXUQVRQ,32VZLWKDQRIIHUSULFHRIDWOHDVW86'SHU
VKDUH+HFRQFOXGHGWKDWUHVXOWVJHQHUDOO\FRQÀUPWKHUHDUHQRGHSDUWXUHVIURPPDUNHWHIÀFLHQF\LQWKH
DIWHUPDUNHW+RZHYHUKHGLGÀQGHYLGHQFHRISRVLWLYHSHUIRUPDQFHLQWKHÀUVW\HDUQHJDWLYHSHUIRUPDQFH
WKHQH[WWKUHH\HDUVDQGJHQHUDOO\SRVLWLYHSHUIRUPDQFHWKHÀIWK\HDUDOWKRXJKWKHVWDQGDUGHUURUVRI
KLVHVWLPDWHVDUHKLJKHQRXJKWRPDNHLWGLIÀFXOWWRUHMHFWPDUNHWHIÀFLHQF\
8 The Aggarwal et al. (1993) study covers different subperiods for the three countries they survey (Brazil, 
Chile, and Mexico).
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sponding returns were -5,50%, -5,40% 
and -13,70%. Except for the one year 
mean market adjusted return, none 
of these values was statistically dif-
ferent from zero at conventional sig-
QLÀFDQFHOHYHOVGXHWRODUJHVWDQGDUG
deviations. 
Perotti and Guney (1993) report in-
ternational evidence on privatization 
,32V· SHUIRUPDQFH IRU)UDQFH WKH
8.6SDLQ&KLOH1LJHULD7XUNH\
Malaysia, Poland, Hungary, and 
Czechoslovakia. However, only in the 
FDVHRIWKH8.)UDQFH7XUNH\DQG
Malaysia, do they explicitly report an 
initial underpricing measurement. 
Based on the analysis of the after-
PDUNHW SHUIRUPDQFH RI WKH8.·V
SULYDWL]DWLRQ ,32V 3HURWWL DQG
Guney (1993) document a very in-
WHUHVWLQJÀQGLQJLQDOPRVWDOOFDVHV
where the initial offering price of 
SULYDWL]DWLRQ ,32V GLG QRW ULVH WR
a premium, governments sold the 
stock through an auction offer with-
RXWDÀ[HGSULFHWHQGHUVDOH:KHQ
the government chose some type of 
À[HGSULFH RIIHULQJ D ODUJH H[FHVV
demand, as measured by the ratio of 
demand to supply at the offer price, 
DQGVLJQLÀFDQWOHYHOVRIXQGHUSULFLQJ
ZHUHREVHUYHG,Q&KLOHDQDXFWLRQ
mechanism was used to issue new 
stock during the 1980s, and privati-
]DWLRQ,32VZHUHQRWDQH[FHSWLRQ
7KHÀQGLQJV RI3HURWWL DQG*XQH\
(1993) are consistent with the re-
sults reported by the Aggarwal et al. 
(1993) study for Chilean privatiza-
WLRQ ,32V DQG VXJJHVW WKDWZKHQ
,32VDUHSODFHGWKURXJKDQDXFWLRQ
mechanism, the market determined 
price eliminates any excess demand. 
Perotti and Guney also identify an 
 Day 1 One  month
Two  
months
Three  
months
One  
year
Two  
years
Three  
years
Mean 7,60% 2,10% 5,40% -5,10% -29,90% -11,50% -10,90%
Median -11,70% -14,90% -9,70% -13,30% -32,40% n.a. n.a.
Std. Dev. 37,80% 35,30% 38,50% 23,20% 17,80% n.a. n.a.
t-statistic 0,64 0,17 0,40 -0,66 -5,04 n.a. n.a.
Number of IPOs reported 9 7 7 8 9 7 4
Table 1. Aftermarket Short-run and Long-run Performance of Chilean Privatiza-
tion IPOs in Aggarwal et al. (1993)
Panel A. Market adjusted returns from day 0
 One  month
Two  
months
Three  
months
One  
year
Two  
years
Three  
years
Mean 16,30% 11,40% 8,50% -5,50% -5,40% -13,70%
Median -5,50% -4,50% 4,80% -20,10% -6,80% -25,00%
Std. Dev. 49,30% 26,30% 30,80% 44,60% 42,40% 58,20%
t-statistic 1,15 1,56 1,14 -0,53 -0,54 -0,88
Number of IPOs 
reported 11 12 16 18 17 13
Panel B. Market adjusted returns from day 1
7XSGOQEVOIX[IEPXLIJJIGXWHYVMRKTVMZEXM^EXMSRMRMXMEPTYFPMGSJJIVWMRCLMPI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increasing volume of privatization 
shares sales, which they associate 
with a model of reputation building. 
They report the tendency of govern-
ments to only partly privatize indi-
vidual companies and retain large 
stakes in them for a few years. Both 
of these tendencies are observed in 
the Chilean privatization program 
described below.
Dewenter and Malatesta (1997) 
made an in-depth analysis of 109 
SULYDWL]DWLRQ,32V·SULFHSHUIRUPDQFH
DQGFRPSDUHGWKHPWRSULYDWH,32V
7KHLU VDPSOH LQFOXGHG ,32V IURP
Canada (13), France (10), Hungary 
(10), Japan (3), Malaysia (12), Poland 
 7KDLODQG  DQG WKH8QLWHG
.LQJGRPVHOHFWHGDPRQJÀ[HG
SULFHSULYDWL]DWLRQ,32V
The authors report both raw and 
market adjusted returns for different 
holding periods following the offer 
date in calendar day intervals (not 
trading days). While a direct com-
parison between the short run perfor-
mance results reported by Perotti and 
*XQH\ZLWKWKHÀQGLQJVRIWKLV
paper (where an auction mechanism 
ZLWKQRÀ[HGSULFHVZDVXVHGLVQRW
possible, long run comparisons are 
still valid. Average raw returns for 
the whole sample for 1, 7, and 30 days 
periods were 25,60%, 25,20% and 
25,70%. Average market adjusted 
returns for equivalent periods were 
23,70%, 23,10%, and 22,80%.9 
7HVWVIRUWKHVWDWLVWLFDOVLJQLÀFDQFH
RIGLIIHUHQFHVEHWZHHQ0HDQ,QLWLDO
5HWXUQV IRU3ULYDWL]DWLRQ,32VDQG
SULYDWHFRPSDQLHV·,32VIRU&DQDGD
France, Hungary, Japan, Malaysia, 
7KDLODQGDQG WKH8. VKRZWKDW
ZKLOHVLJQLÀFDQWGLIIHUHQFHV IRU WKH
aggregate sample are non-existent, 
individual country results tell a dif-
IHUHQWVWRU\6WDWLVWLFDOO\VLJQLÀFDQW
positive differences suggest that 
%ULWLVKSULYDWL]DWLRQ,32VZHUHXQ-
GHUSULFHGPRUHWKDQSULYDWH,32V2Q
the contrary, results for Canada and 
0DOD\VLD LQGLFDWH VLJQLÀFDQWQHJD-
WLYHGLIIHUHQFHV,IWKHUHLVDWHQGHQF\
IRUJRYHUQPHQWRIÀFLDOVWRXQGHUSULFH
,32VWRDJUHDWHUH[WHQWWKDQSULYDWH
issuers, no conclusive evidence was 
obtained from this study. 
3. PRIVATIZATION IN CHILE
While Chile was a pioneer of the 
privatization efforts initiating a 
comprehensive process during the 
1970s,10 during the following two 
decades many other Latin American 
countries followed the same path;11 
but, even today, the process is yet 
far from complete. Privatization is 
still taking place on a large scale 
in Latin America, Eastern Europe 
and several other regions of the 
world. For that reason, the insights 
obtained from a detailed analysis of 
historical privatization experiences 
can contribute to an improvement 
in the design of future privatization 
plans.
Among the antecedents of the Chil-
HDQPLOLWDU\JRYHUQPHQW·VSULYDWL]D-
tion program (1973-1990) were vast 
expropriation activities of previous 
governments. The Agricultural Re-
9 A detailed account of country-by-country raw and Market Adjusted Returns for equivalent periods is 
FRQWDLQHGLQ'HZHQWHUDQG0DODWHVWD7DEOH,SRSFLW
 7KHÀUVWSULYDWL]DWLRQDFWLRQVWRRNSODFHVKRUWDIWHUWKHPLOLWDU\JRYHUQPHQWZDVLQVWDOOHGLQ
 1RWDEO\$UJHQWLQD%UD]LO&RORPELD0p[LFR3HU~DQG9HQH]XHOD
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form Legislation passed during the 
Alessandri regime (1958-1964), es-
tablished a framework for the trans-
ference of privately owned assets to 
the state. That piece of legislation 
was an important component of the 
political agenda of Frei (1964 -1970) 
and reached its maximum expression 
during the socialist government of 
Allende (1970 -1973), along with his 
plans to establish a centrally planned 
economy in Chile (Mandakovic and 
Lima, 1990). 
The military took-over political power 
in September 1973, and initiated a 
wide ranging privatization program 
which consistently reduced the 
public sector participation in GNP 
(Gross National Product), except for 
a brief interlude associated with the 
ÀQDQFLDOFULVLVRI7DEOH
presents the increasing participation 
RI62(VLQ&KLOH·V*'3IURPWR
1973 and, after the military govern-
ment took over, a profound reversal.
Table 2. State Owned Enterprises’ 
(SOEs) participation in Chile’s GDP
Year Participation
1965 14,20%
1973 39,00%
1981 24,10%
1988 15,90%
6RXUFH$GDSWHGIURP+DFKHWWHDQG/-
ders (1994). 
The privatization program is com-
monly divided in two rounds, clearly 
related with different stages in the 
evolution of the Chilean economic 
PRGHO 7KH ÀUVW URXQG VWDUWHG DO-
most simultaneously with a period 
of severe economic crisis (1975) and 
finished with still another crisis 
(1982-1983). 
During the First Round, privatization 
mechanisms favored the concentra-
tion of ownership in the hands of 
D IHZ LQÁXHQWLDO HFRQRPLF JURXSV
Some of the mechanisms that favored 
concentration of ownership were, for 
example, the use of intra-group loans 
and access to generous credit lines 
IURP WKH&RUSRUDFLyQ ,QGXVWULDO GH
Fomento12 (Corfo), paying in cash 
only a small portion of the privatized 
ÀUPV·SULFHV
'XULQJWKHHDUO\V&KLOH·VHFRQ-
omy faced a drastic deterioration of 
its international terms of trade as a 
consequence of sensible reductions 
RI LWVPDLQ H[SRUWV· SULFHV DQG VLJ-
QLÀFDQW LQFUHDVHV RI LQWHUQDWLRQDO
interest rates. After several years 
ZLWKDÀ[HGH[FKDQJHUDWHLQVSLWH
RI VLJQLÀFDQW LQÁDWLRQGLIIHUHQWLDOV
with respect to its main commercial 
partners, the economy collapsed 
DQG D VLJQLÀFDQW GHYDOXDWLRQZDV
unavoidable. The foreign debt crisis 
of 1982 further complicated domestic 
problems, eliminating the possibility 
to obtain any fresh external funds. 
The GNP decreased by 14,10% in 
1982 and 0,70% during the following 
\HDU8QHPSOR\PHQW UDWHV UHDFKHG
levels of 22,10% and 22,20%; and 
LQÁDWLRQVWDELOL]HGDWLQ
and 23,10% in 1983. 
Economic trouble seriously affected 
GHEWRUVRIWKHÀQDQFLDOV\VWHPDQG
due to the high interdependence 
 7KH´&RUSRUDFLyQ,QGXVWULDOGH)RPHQWRµ LVD&KLOHDQJRYHUQPHQWVSRQVRUHGLQGXVWULDOGHYHORSPHQW
agency that performed the function of holding company for most nationalized companies and also managed 
the privatization process through an area called “Gerencia de Normalización”.
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between industrial companies and 
ÀQDQFLDOHQWLWLHVWKHODWWHUZHUHSDU-
ticularly vulnerable to the adverse 
environmental circumstances. With 
UHGXFHGFDVKÁRZVDQGWKHIUHHIDOO
in the value of assets in guarantee, 
many highly leveraged firms and 
individuals declared payments sus-
pension and insolvency. 
Bad loans increased from 2,30% to 
4,10% of total loans between 1981 
and 1982, reaching 8,40% at the end 
RI 8QSURGXFWLYH ORDQV UHSUH-
VHQWHGRIWKHÀQDQFLDOV\VWHP
net worth in 1981, 45,70% in 1982, 
and a staggering 109,60% in 1983. 
As debtors could not pay their loans 
and many banks were leveraged 
in dollars, the threat of a bank run 
became imminent. Finally, govern-
ment authorities decided to bail-out 
illiquid banks to protect depositors 
and external creditors (Alé, Larraín, 
0DOODW2UWX]DUDQG9LGHOD
Paradoxically, the conditions cre-
ated by the privatization strategy of 
the First Round were such that the 
government was forced to take con-
trol of numerous banks once again 
and, indirectly, of all non-banking 
ÀUPVFRQWUROOHGE\WKHEDQNV$OPRVW
ÀIW\ UHFHQWO\ SULYDWL]HG FRPSDQLHV
returned to the hands of the State 
during 1982-1983. 
+RZHYHU DOO ÀUPV WKDW IHOO XQGHU
WKHJRYHUQPHQW·VFRQWURODVDFRQVH-
quence of the crisis were sold-back 
to the private sector during the fol-
lowing years in what was dubbed 
the second round of privatizations 
(1984-89). 
During that period, besides privatiz-
LQJDJDLQÀUPVWKDWKDGDOUHDG\EHHQ
privatized during the First Round, 
but had fallen back under govern-
mental control as a consequence of 
the crisis, several large public utili-
ties originally created by the state 
OLNH &KLOH·V QDWLRQDO DLUOLQH WKH
telephone and electric companies and 
some mining companies, were also 
privatized. 
Also, ownership transference mecha-
QLVPVZHUHGLYHUVLÀHGDQGQHZUXOHV
enforced to avoid the problems of 
WKHV·SULYDWL]DWLRQH[SHULHQFH
Among the innovative features of the 
Second Round was that the income 
maximization objective no longer 
UHPDLQHGDVWKHJRYHUQPHQW·VVLQJOH
priority. Alternative objectives like 
the promotion of the local capital 
market and the wider distribution of 
stock ownership among the popula-
tion were also included. According 
to Hachette and Lüders (1994), the 
Chilean government had learned that 
privatizations can be reversed and 
was ready to pay a price to minimize 
that probability. 
Controlling packages of equity were 
privatized in closed bidding auctions, 
similar to the First Round. However, 
an important difference was that this 
time no government subsidized credit 
lines were available, and buyers 
were required to demonstrate their 
solvency. 
As a consequence of the 1981-1982 
crisis, local private investors were 
undercapitalized. However, there 
was a growing interest among foreign 
investors to participate in the rapidly 
modernizing Chilean economy and 
the government, recognizing the im-
plications of a thin capital market for 
the success of its privatization pro-
gram, deliberately included foreign 
investors in privatization auctions. 
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Foreign participation in privatized 
companies took place mainly through 
joint-venture arrangements. 
2QHODVWKLJKO\VLJQLÀFDQWGLIIHUHQFH
between the First and the Second 
Round was the fact that local capital 
PDUNHWV·GHYHORSPHQWZDVFRQVLGHU-
ably more advanced due to the sig-
QLÀFDQWLPSXOVHUHFHLYHGVLQFH13 
IURPDQLQWHQVHÀQDQFLDOOLEHUDOL]D-
tion process14 and the introduction of 
privately managed retirement funds, 
named Administradoras de Fondos 
de Pensiones (AFPs for their abbre-
viation in Spanish).15
4. GRADUALISM IN THE 
CHILEAN PRIVATIZATION 
PROCESS
3ULYDWL]DWLRQ RI 62(V HIIHFWLYHO\
limits government intervention in 
managerial and strategic decisions. 
However, once privatized, firms 
are still exposed to adverse policy 
changes. 
,QYLHZ WKDWSULYDWL]DWLRQSURFHHGV
to the government are lowered when 
companies might be subject to unde-
sired political actions, selling govern-
ments frequently structure privatiza-
tion programs as to gradually build 
up policy credibility (Perotti, 1991; 
Perotti and Guney, 1993). 
2QH ZD\ LQ ZKLFK JRYHUQPHQWV
signal their commitment to market 
oriented policies is by retaining a 
non-controlling stock participation 
LQSULYDWL]HGÀrms for long periods of 
WLPH:KLOHJRYHUQPHQWRIÀFLDOVDUH
not direct owners of stock and for that 
reason do not have a personal interest 
in maximizing the income obtained 
WKURXJK SULYDWL]HG ILUPV· VHOOLQJ
auctions, state ownership implies 
SROLWLFDO DFFRXQWDELOLW\ ,Q JHQHUDO
politicians will avoid governmental 
actions that will have adverse effects 
RQVHPLSULYDWL]HGÀUPVRUHOVHIDFH
recrimination from political opposi-
tion, which can eventually produce 
unfavorable elections results. 
Combined with the transference 
of managerial control to private 
investors, a government keeping 
symbolic ownership participation 
signals its willingness to bear at 
least part of the potential costs of 
an eventual policy change. After 
some time, if there are no policy 
UHYHUVDOV LQYHVWRUV· FRQILGHQFH
improves, facilitating subsequent 
privatization prices convergence 
to their expected economic value. 
This is in agreement with Perotti 
(1991) who provides a rationale 
for treating with special care the 
sales of policy-sensitive state-owned 
HQWHUSULVHVDQGMXVWLÀHVWKDWDFRP-
mitted government will choose a 
gradual privatization instead of an 
immediate privatization.
While the military government in 
Chile did not depend on the results 
of periodic elections to remain in 
power, the privatization program 
 2QO\DWWHQXDWHGE\WKHÀQDQFLDOFULVLVRI
 :KLFKEHJXQLQWKHODWHVEXWLQWHQVLÀHGGXULQJDQG
 $FFXPXODWHGÀQDQFLDOUHVRXUFHVPDQDJHGE\$)3VLQ'HFHPEHUZKHQWKH\ZHUHDXWKRUL]HGWREX\
stock for their investment portfolios, represented 11% of GNP. AFPs have the responsibility to manage 
ODUJHDQGFRQVWDQWO\JURZLQJDPRXQWVRIÀQDQFLDOUHVRXUFHVRULJLQDWHGLQZRUNHUVDQGHPSOR\HHVFRQ-
WULEXWLRQVWRWKHLULQGLYLGXDOUHWLUHPHQWDFFRXQWV8QWLOZKHQ$)3VZHUHÀQDOO\DOORZHGWRLQYHVW
overseas all pension funds had to be invested in the domestic market.
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had become one of the central is-
VXHV RI WKHPLOLWDU\ JRYHUQPHQW·V
HFRQRPLF SROLF\ DQG RIÀFLDOVPXVW
have been very careful to manage it 
SURSHUO\2EVHUYHGJUDGXDOLVPLQWKH
1984-1989 privatization programs is 
clearly consistent with the argument 
of credibility building. 
$IWHUWKHÀQDQFLDOFULVLV
and economic recession, once the 
economy was stabilized, the priva-
tization program was reinitiated in 
1984. The originally stated objective 
for the Second Round was to reach 
a maximum private participation 
LQFRQWUROOHGE\&RUIRÀUPVRI
in nineteen cases and 49% in two 
others. Four years later the original 
targets had been broadly exceeded. 
%\0DUFKHLJKWHHQÀUPVKDG
been 100% privatized and eight 
more were programmed to reach 
that objective.
The strategy that was followed de-
notes a careful observation of local 
FDSLWDOPDUNHW·VFRQGLWLRQVDGMXVW-
ing the issues program whenever 
FRQGLWLRQV· FKDQJHV MXVWLÀHG VXFK
adjustments. General conditions 
for privatization public offers of 
stock improved considerably after 
1985, when AFPs were authorized 
to buy stock for their investments 
portfolio.16 
:KLOHSULYDWL]DWLRQSURJUDPV·JUDGX-
alism in emerging countries probably 
UHÁHFWVORFDOFDSLWDOPDUNHWV·OLPLWHG
absorption capacity privatization 
,32VUHSUHVHQWHGDYHU\VPDOOSUR-
SRUWLRQRIWKHSULYDWL]HGÀUPV·WRWDO
equity (most of the time, below 2%), 
and subsequent privatization issues 
were not very important in absolute 
value, but were indeed very numer-
RXVDQGUHFHLYHGDVLJQLÀFDQWIROORZ
up by the local press. 
The constant adjustment to the 
original privatization targets was 
explained by Corfo (Hachette and 
Lüders, 1994), in terms of the small 
size of the Chilean capital market 
and of the Bolsa de Santiago in par-
ticular, arguing that such a strategy 
allowed a sustained increase in the 
SULFH REWDLQHG IRU 62(V· VWRFN%\
contrast, Hachette and Lüders, com-
menting on the original privatization 
WDUJHWV· DGMXVWPHQWV VXJJHVW WKDW
an announcement of the intention to 
privatize 100% of the ownership could 
have allowed the expected favorable 
effect since the beginning. 
A political argument, however, also 
offers a sensible explanation of the 
DGMXVWPHQWV ,Q IDFH RI WKH XQFHU-
tainty that existed at the beginning 
of the Second Round, after the bitter 
experience of the previous round, the 
Chilean government may have de-
cided that the impact of announcing 
a partial privatization would create 
a favorable environment and allow 
further increases to the privatization 
targets once satisfactory results of 
initial privatizations became evident. 
That strategy would minimize the 
political cost of a “once and for all” 
announcement.
The implementation of the program 
FRQVLVWHGLQÀUVWPDNLQJYHU\VPDOO
,32V RI VHOHFWHG FRPSDQLHV· VWRFN
to create a presence in the market. 
 ,WVHHPVREYLRXVWKDWDXWKRUL]LQJ$)3VWRLQYHVWSDUWRIWKHLUIXQGVLQVWRFNZDVDWOHDVWSDUWLDOO\LQVSLUHG
by the intention to create favorable conditions for privatization issues.
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$VFRQÀGHQFHZDVEXLOWLQFUHPHQ-
tal private ownership levels were 
authorized, and additional issues 
followed to meet more ambitious 
targets.
&KLOHDQ 62(·V SULYDWL]DWLRQ ,32V
DQG6HDVRQHG3XEOLF ,VVXHV 63,V
followed a process that started with 
DQ$JUHHPHQW RI &RUIR·V %RDUG RI
Administration authorizing the Ex-
HFXWLYH9LFHSUHVLGHQWWRVHOO62(V·
stock to private investors.17 Resolu-
WLRQVLQGLFDWLQJVSHFLÀFGHWDLOVOLNH
WKH FKRLFH RI D VSHFLÀF EURNHU DQG
the price and number of shares to 
be sold in order to materialize the 
stated objectives of the agreements, 
followed.18
5. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 
While the size of the sample used 
is small to derive externally valid 
statistical conclusions, limited data 
DYDLODELOLW\ZDVGLIÀFXOWWRRYHUFRPH
However, a statistical analysis of 
the short-run and long-run returns 
RI&KLOHDQSULYDWL]DWLRQ,32VRIIHUV
interesting insights. 
Based on a comprehensive review 
of the most important local daily 
newspapers and a careful revision of 
&RUIR·VKLVWRULFDOÀOHV19HOHYHQ,32V
GDWHVZHUH LGHQWLÀHG IRUWKHSHULRG
of reference.
The auction mechanism resulted in 
PDQ\ GLIIHUHQW ,32V· SULFHV $V D
matter of fact, each transaction dur-
ing the auction period could poten-
tially have taken place at a unique 
price. As mentioned before, making 
the identification of exact issue 
SULFHVPRUHGLIÀFXOWLVVXHUVZHUHQRW
REOLJHGWRUHSRUW,32V·SULFHVWRDQ\
government authorities. Not even 
the Superintendencia de Valores, the 
&KLOHDQVWRFNPDUNHWRIÀFLDOVXSHU-
visory agency, kept records of that 
SHULRG·VSULYDWL]DWLRQ,32·VSULFHV
Time series data for closing prices on 
WKHHOHYHQLGHQWLÀHGSULYDWL]HGÀUPV·
stock were obtained from the Bolsa 
de Comercio de Santiago for a period 
that goes from 1984 through 1989. 
Supplemental published information 
for all companies traded in the Bolsa 
 ,Q-XQHWKH%RDUGDXWKRUL]HG&RUIR·V9LFHSUHVLGHQWWRSULYDWL]HXSWRRIWKHVWRFNLQHDFK
one of its subsidiaries. However, privatization targets were subject to constant changes. According to 
Hachette and Lüders (1994, p. 39), “out of 33 companies in the privatization process, 20 suffered one 
change in their annual target percentages of equity privatization, 3 suffered 3 changes and 1 suffered 4 
changes”. 
 7KHSURFHVVRISODFLQJSULYDWL]DWLRQ,32VLQ&KLOHGXULQJZDVVSHFLDOLQVHYHUDOUHVSHFWV
% 'XULQJWKHPLGHLJKWLHVWKHXVHRIHTXLW\ÀQDQFLQJWKURXJKSXEOLFLVVXHVZDVQRWFRPPRQLQ&KLOH6HYHUDO
VWUXFWXUDOFKDQJHVKDGWRWDNHSODFHLQFOXGLQJQHZFDSLWDOPDUNHW·VUHJXODWLRQVDQGWKHDXWKRUL]DWLRQ
IRULQVWLWXWLRQDOLQYHVWRUVVXFKDVSHQVLRQIXQGV$GPLQLVWUDGRUDVGH)RQGRVGH3HQVLRQHVRU$)3·VLQ
6SDQLVKDQGIRUHLJQLQYHVWPHQWIXQGVSDUWLFLSDWLRQWRFUHDWHIDYRUDEOHFRQGLWLRQVIRUSULYDWL]DWLRQ,32V
(Celis and Maturana, 1998).
% 7KH&KLOHDQ,32·VPDUNHWGXULQJWKHSHULRGRIDQDO\VLVXVHGDpublic auction procedure. 
% ,VVXHUVGLGQRWKDYHWKHUHVSRQVLELOLW\WRUHSRUWUHFRUGHGLVVXHSULFHV
% ,32·VZHUHQRWXQGHUZULWWHQ LQVWHDGEURNHUVLQYHVWPHQWEDQNHUV RIIHUHG WKHPGLUHFWO\ WR LQYHVWRUV
during public auction sessions and on a commission basis (i.e., similar to block trades). 
% 3ULYDWL]DWLRQ,32·VFRQVLVWHGRIYHU\VPDOOEORFNVRIVWRFNDQGRIWHQODVWHGIRUVHYHUDOGD\VRUHYHQZHHNV
% 6LQFHWKHUHZHUHQRXQGHUZULWHUVWKHUHZDVQRÀUPFRPPLWPHQW0DUNHWIRUFHVGHWHUPLQHGGLIIHUHQW
SULFHVDWVXEVHTXHQWVWDJHVRIDSULYDWL]DWLRQ,32·VDXFWLRQ
% ,QFRQWUDVWZLWKW\SLFDO8QLWHG6WDWHV,32VRIVPDOOJURZWKFRPSDQLHVVHYHUDOSULYDWL]HGFRPSDQLHV
were long established and fairly large utilities; others were well known mining companies.
 $FFHVVWR&RUIR·VKLVWRULFDODUFKLYHVZDVIDFLOLWDWHGE\0U(GXDUGR%LWUiQ*HQHUDO0DQDJHUDWWKHWLPH
this study was developed, during the second semester of 1996.
7XSGOQEVOIX[IEPXLIJJIGXWHYVMRKTVMZEXM^EXMSRMRMXMEPTYFPMGSJJIVWMRCLMPI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de Comercio de Santiago was used 
to adjust for recorded market price 
variations not due to market forces.20
7KHÀUVWGD\RIWUDGLQJFORVLQJSULFH
ZDVFKRVHQDV WKHÀUVWREVHUYDWLRQ
for each series based on several 
FRQVLGHUDWLRQV ,Q WKH ILUVW SODFH
DVPHQWLRQHG DERYH WKH DXFWLRQV·
initial prices were not recorded in 
DQ\SXEOLFO\DYDLODEOHÀOH%HVLGHV
participants in auction sessions were 
in many cases institutional invest-
ors21 who entered into long positions 
to re-sell them in the aftermarket. 
For that reason, as suggested by 
Aggarwal et al. (1993), new issues 
must be examined from the view-
point of the investor who purchases 
WKH VWRFN LQ WKH DIWHUPDUNHW ,Q
Chile a vast majority of individual 
investors who purchased privatized 
companies stock paid an aftermarket 
price different from the initial price 
negotiated by large intermediaries 
during the auction transactions. For 
WKDWUHDVRQÀUVWGD\RIWUDGLQJFORV-
ing prices might be considered more 
representative of the price paid by 
typical investors.22
To measure the performance of priva-
WL]DWLRQ,32VGDLO\0DUNHW$GMXVWHG
Returns (MARs) were calculated for 
HDFKÀUP0$5VIRUWKHHOHYHQ,32V
were combined in portfolios to obtain 
Average Market Adjusted Returns 
(AMARs),23 and the null hypothesis 
that AMARs were not statistically 
different from zero was tested. 
Raw and market-adjusted returns 
calculations were performed as fol-
lows:
20 Basically, splits. Prices were not adjusted for dividend payments because the benchmark portfolio used 
ERWKIRUWKHPDUNHWDGMXVWHGPRGHOXVHGWRPHDVXUHDEQRUPDOUHWXUQV7KH,QGLFH*HQHUDOGH3UHFLRV
$FFLRQDULRVGHOD%ROVDGH6DQWLDJR,*3$6WRFN0DUNHW3ULFH,QGH[IRUWKH6DQWLDJR6WRFN([FKDQJH
is not adjusted for dividend payments.
21 Stock brokers, Pension funds, Mutual funds, etc.
 ([FHVVUHWXUQVLQWKLVVWXG\DVVXPHSXUFKDVHRIWKHLVVXHVDWWKHFORVLQJSULFHRIWKHÀUVWGD\RIWUDGLQJ
 ,32V·GDWHVZHUHV\QFKURQL]HGWRPDNH0$5VFRPSDUDEOH
 7KH,*3$RU,QGLFH*HQHUDOGH3UHFLRV$FFLRQDULRVRIWKH6DQWLDJR([FKDQJH0DUNHWZDVXVHGDVDSUR[\
of the market portfolio.
Pit 
rit  = In (Pit) – In (Pi,t –1)
It Stock market index on day t, excluding dividend re-
investment
rmt  = log( It) – log(It –1) 
MARit  = rit – rmt
CMARim = MARit Cumulative market adjusted return for company i 
from day 0 through day m
AMARt  =MARit / n
CAMARm = AMARt Cumulative average market adjusted returns from 
day 0 through date m
Closing stock price for company i on day t
Raw, one-day return for company i·VVWRFNRQGD\t
2QHGD\UHWXUQIRUWKHPDUNHWLQGH[RQGD\t24
Market Adjusted Return for company i on day t
Average market adjusted return on day t
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WRt is the wealth relative on day t; 
CRit is  the cumulative (buy and hold) 
return of stock i from closing price 
on day 0 through day t, CRimt is the 
cumulative (buy and hold) market 
return, during the same period. The 
WRWDOQXPEHURI,32VLQWKHVDPSOH
(11) is represented by n. A wealth 
UHODWLYHDERYHRQHLPSOLHVWKDW,32V
outperformed the market, and vice-
versa, a wealth relative below one 
indicates underperformance.
Evidence on Chilean privatization 
,32V· VKRUW UXQXQGHUSULFLQJZDV
in general terms, consistent with 
,32SHUIRUPDQFHHYDOXDWLRQUHVXOWV
reported elsewhere.25 
,32VLQ&KLOHGXULQJDQG
were more numerous than the rest of 
the period, as shown in Table 3. 
The number of observations for each 
period varies, as some companies had 
DORQJHUSRVW,32KLVWRU\WKDQRWKHUV
as reported in Table 4.
Cumulative Average Market Ad-
justed Returns (CAMARs) went from 
Wealth relatives were calculated as 
in Ritter (1991) and Aggarwal et al. 
(1993):
Ʊm = [(CMARim – CAMARm)2/n –1]0,5 Standard deviation for cumulative aver-
age market adjusted returns
t= CAMARm /(Ʊm /n0,5)
(1)WRt = 
1+  CRimt
1
n
n
i =1
1+  CRit
1
n
n
i =1
GXULQJ WKHÀUVWGD\RI WUDG-
ing after the initial closing price, to 
9,52% in day two and 7,81% in day 
3, as reported in Table 4. After the 
ÀUVWIHZGD\V·KLJKUHWXUQVWKHUHZDV
a mean-reversion, probably due to an 
initial over-reaction. However, by the 
HQGRIWKHÀUVWPRQWK&$0$5VKDG
recovered and consistently increased, 
reaching a ceiling after a little more 
than three months. The fact that 
investors who participated in priva-
WL]DWLRQ,32VEX\LQJVWRFNDWGD\RQH
closing prices obtained a CAMAR of 
approximately 20% during that pe-
riod suggests that initial offer prices 
were probably underpriced.
25 See, for example, Aggarwal et al. (1993) for an extensive survey of studies that document short run per-
IRUPDQFHRI,32V
Table 3. Calendar of Chilean Priva-
tized Companies’ Initial Public Offers 
(1984-1989)
Year Company Name Date of IPO
1984 C.A.P. Nov. 23
1985 Chilgener Aug. 30
1985 Endesa Sep. 26
1985 ENTEL Oct. 3
1986 Teléfonos Apr. 25
1986 Labchile Aug. 14
1987 Schwager Jan. 13
1989 Elecda Jan 31
1989 Eliqsa Feb. 2
1989 Emelari Feb. 2
1989 Lanchile Jul. 24
6RXUFH$GPLQLVWUDWLYHÀOHVNHSWDW&RUIR
and accessed by the author in Santiago, 
Chile, during 1995.
7XSGOQEVOIX[IEPXLIJJIGXWHYVMRKTVMZEXM^EXMSRMRMXMEPTYFPMGSJJIVWMRCLMPI
 t value for cumulative average market 
adjusted returns
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Mid-term and long-term CAMARs in 
the sample had a deceiving evolution 
becoming negative eight months after 
WKH,32V·GDWH
During year 2, and after reaching 
-18%, CAMARs recovered (reaching 
+12%), but then declined again, be-
came negative, and did not recover 
for the rest of the three year period, 
as can be observed in Graph 1. 
&$0$5VZHUH VWDWLVWLFDOO\ VLJQLÀ-
cant different from zero during the 
ÀUVWWKUHHGD\V26DIWHUWKH,32VHH
Table 4). Again, after two months, 
&$0$5VEHFDPHVWDWLVWLFDOO\VLJQLÀ-
cant during a period that goes until 
WKHHQGRIWKHÀIWKPRQWK27 However, 
from that moment and until the end 
of the three-year window, no statisti-
FDOO\ VLJQLÀFDQWGLIIHUHQW IURP]HUR
values were found (see Graph 2). 
:HDOWK5HODWLYH,QGH[YDOXHVUHDFK
a maximum value of 1,22 after three 
and a half months and then decreases 
(except for a short recovery) below 
1,00 after 20 months, reaching a 
minimum level of 0,80 at the end of 
the period, as observed in Graph 3. 
Table 4. Cumulative raw and market adjusted returns for Chilean privatized 
companies’ IPOs
Period Number of IPOs reported
Raw cumul.  
return 
Market adj.  
cumulative return
Standard  
deviation t value
Wealth  
relative
1 day 11 0,0547 0,0487 0,1107 1,460* 1,0446
2 days 11 0,0999 0,0952 0,1486 2,125** 1,0994
3 days 11 0,0806 0,0781 0,1369 1,892** 1,0832
10 days 11 0,0319 0,0003 0,1786 0,0540 0,9968
1 month 11 0,0329 -0,0002 0,1681 -0,0030 1,0096
2 months 11 0,1063 0,0432 0,1590 0,9000 1,0430
3 months 11 0,2542 0,1215 0,2765 1,698* 1,1532
6 months 10 0,3297 0,1087 0,2900 1,1860 1,1136
1 year 7 0,4406 -0,0382 0,5071 -0,1990 0,9590
2 years 7 0,8718 -0,0766 0,8116 -0,2500 0,9278
3 years 6 1,0614 -0,1841 1,0186 -0,4430 0,8335
6LJQLÀFDQWDWWKHOHYHO6LJQLÀFDQWDWWKHOHYHO
WYDOXHVIRUGHJUHHVRIIUHHGRPZHUHVLJQLÀFDQWDWWKHOHYHOIRUGD\RQHDQGDWWKHOHYHOIRU
days 2 and 3.
27 Periods refer to approximate calendar days.
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Graph 1. Cumulative market adjusted returns for Chilean privatized companies 
IPOs Portfolio
Source: Own calculations.
Graph 2. t values for portfolio of Chilean privatized companies IPOs cumulative 
market adjusted returns
6LJQLÀFDQWDWWKHOHYHO6LJQLÀFDQWDWWKHOHYHO
Source: Own calculations.
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Evidence presented in Table 4 is 
consistent with previous studies 
RQ SULYDWL]DWLRQ ,32V DIWHUPDUNHW
performance (e.g., Aggarwal et al., 
1993; Loughran et al., 1994; Perotti 
and Guney, 1993). Short-run larger 
than expected28 returns and long run 
ORZSURÀOHSHUIRUPDQFHLQGLFDWHWKDW
the Chilean privatization process 
followed other documented interna-
tional regularities.
6. DISCUSSION 
,Q WKHFRQWH[WRI WKHKLVWRULFDODQG
institutional peculiarities of the Chil-
ean capital market during the period 
WKDWSULYDWL]DWLRQ,32VWRRNSODFHLW
LVGLIÀFXOWWRVXSSRUWWKHYDOLGLW\RI
JHQHUDOO\DFFHSWHG,32V·XQGHUSULF-
ing explanations, most of which have 
usually been developed to explain 
XQGHUSULFLQJRI,32VLQPRUHPDWXUH
and developed markets.
For example, the legal liability impli-
cations of inadequate due diligence as 
an explanation for the underpricing 
RI,32VZHUHTXLWHGLIIHUHQWLQ&KLOH
ZKHQFRPSDUHGWRWKH8QLWHG6WDWHV
Claims for compensation against in-
vestment bankers were much more 
GLIÀFXOWWRFDUU\RXWPDNLQJ7LQLF·V
(1988) theory a relatively weak expla-
QDWLRQRI&KLOHDQSULYDWL]DWLRQ,32V·
underpricing. More so, considering 
that the issuer was the Chilean state 
itself.
,QIRUPDWLRQ $V\PPHWU\ DQRWKHU
one of the most frequently cited theo-
ULHV WR H[SODLQ ,32VXQGHUSULFLQJ
Graph 3. Wealth relative index for Chilean privatized companies’ portfolio and 
IGPA
Source: Own calculations.
 $FFRUGLQJWRWKHDVVHW·VV\VWHPDWLFULVNXQGHUWKHDVVXPSWLRQVRIWKH&DSLWDO$VVHW3ULFLQJ0RGHO&$30
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reaches critical levels in emerging 
PDUNHWVEHFDXVHLVVXLQJÀUPVKDYH
fewer opportunities to obtain current 
LQIRUPDWLRQRQVLPLODUÀUP·VLVVXHV
and pricing decisions, and there is 
less competition among underwriting 
DJHQWV ,Q FRQVHTXHQFH RQHZRXOG
H[SHFWWRVHHDPRUHVLJQLÀFDQWOHYHO
RI ,32XQGHUSULFLQJ WKDQ LQPRUH
developed markets.29 However, given 
the characteristics of the auction-like 
process, similar to block-trades, used 
IRUSULYDWL]DWLRQ,32SODFHPHQWVLQ
Chile (Aggarwal et al., 1993) and 
Loughran et al. (1994) investment 
bankers did not really perform as 
XQGHUZULWHUV,QWKDWVHQVH%DURQ·V
model is neither adequate to explain 
&KLOHDQ SULYDWL]DWLRQ ,32VXQGHU-
pricing (Baron, 1982). 
Regarding the theories that explain 
underpricing as a consequence of 
WKHLVVXLQJÀUPVEHLQJOLWWOHNQRZQ
in this case most were highly visible 
LQ&KLOHEHIRUH,32VWRRNSODFHVXJ-
JHVWLQJWKDW5RFN·VDSSURDFK
cannot offer a reasonable explanation 
of short run underpricing. While in 
PRUHGHYHORSHGPDUNHWV ,32VXVX-
ally correspond to new fast-growth 
companies, Chilean privatization 
,32VGXULQJWKHVFRUUHVSRQGHG
to usually larger and older companies 
(e.g., Aggarwal et al., 1993; Perotti 
and Guney, 1993). 
Given the limited applicability of 
SRSXODU ,32XQGHUSULFLQJ WKHRULHV
a different explanation supported by 
the economic and political context of 
&KLOHDQ SULYDWL]DWLRQ ,32V GXULQJ
1984-1989 represents an original 
contribution to the understanding of 
that process. 
/RZHUWKDQHFRQRPLFDOO\MXVWLÀDEOH
proceeds on Chilean privatization 
,32VFDQEHDWWULEXWHGWRWKHJRY-
HUQPHQW·VFRQÀGHQFHEXLOGLQJVWUDW-
HJ\8QGHUSULFLQJ RI HDUO\ SULYD-
tization stock sales, should have 
stimulated market participants to 
absorb a larger volume of priva-
WL]HG ÀUPV VWRFN GXULQJ WKH HDUO\
stages of the program and it must 
also have been interpreted as addi-
WLRQDOHYLGHQFHRIWKHJRYHUQPHQW·V
willingness to transfer management 
FRQWURO WR WKH QHZ RZQHUV ,Q WKH
long-run, subsequent privatization 
,32VDQG6HFRQGDU\(TXLW\2IIHUV
6(2VZRXOG EHPDGH LQ DPRUH
FRQÀGHQW HQYLURQPHQW DQGZRXOG
eventually result in higher privati-
zation proceeds.
:KLOHSULYDWL]DWLRQ ,32XQGHUSULF-
ing did not maximize government 
proceeds in the short-run, attrac-
tive returns obtained by investors 
increased subsequent privatization 
LVVXHV GHPDQG ,QFUHDVHG GHPDQG
resulted in easier placements and in 
prices converging to their true eco-
nomic value in a natural way. 
The above arguments are consistent 
with a signaling approach to explain 
,32V· XQGHUSULFLQJ 0RVW RI WKH
literature on Signaling Theory has 
referred to underpricing as a means 
to suggest quality of assets (see, for 
example, Allen and Faulhaber, 1989), 
and signaling commitment to privati-
]DWLRQSROLFLHVE\XQGHUSULFLQJ62(V
 ,QHPHUJLQJPDUNHWVXQGHUZULWHUVVKRXOGKDYHWKHPDUNHWSRZHUWRFRQGLWLRQODUJHGLVFRXQWVRQKLJK
TXDOLW\ÀUPVWRSURYLGHDÀUPFRPPLWPHQWDUUDQJHPHQW
7XSGOQEVOIX[IEPXLIJJIGXWHYVMRKETVMZEXM^EXMSRMRMXMEPTYFPMGSJJIVWMRCLMPI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has also been discussed in privatiza-
tion studies,30 but not explicitly dis-
cussed in the context of privatization 
,32XQGHUSULFLQJ
An explanation of signaling by under-
SULFLQJWREXLOGFRQÀGHQFHLVIXUWKHU
supported with the gradualism fol-
lowed by the Chilean government in 
WKH LVVXH RI SULYDWL]HGÀUPV· VWRFN
Gradualism can be interpreted as a 
signaling device that conveyed the 
message that the government was 
willing to share the risks implicit in 
potential shifts of policy by keeping 
a symbolic participation in privatized 
ÀUPV HYHQ DIWHU FRUSRUDWH FRQWURO
had already been transferred to the 
private sector).
Gradual sales with frequent ÀQHWXQ-
ing of privatization targets suggest 
that the government had superior 
information over the value of the 
SULYDWL]HGÀUPV· DVVHWVDQGQHHGHG
to transfer that information to the 
market. However, if private invest-
ors were better informed, a single-
auction sale should have maximized 
SULYDWL]DWLRQSURFHHGV ,Q FRQWUDVW
the process of carefully scheduled 
gradual sales together with a high 
level of discounts suggests that, for 
one reason or another maybe of a 
political nature, the government 
needed to convey some strong signal 
to the market. 
Additional evidence supporting a 
FRQÀGHQFHEXLOGLQJE\XQGHUSULFLQJ
hypothesis is the faster growth rate 
experienced by the market absorption 
capacity for privatization issues than 
what domestic saving rates would 
have granted, and the fact that larger 
privatization issues became more 
frequent. 
The Chilean experience through 
SULYDWL]DWLRQ ,32V RIIHUV YDOXDEOH
insights about gradualism and un-
derpricing as useful tactics to achieve 
ambitious targets in an emerging 
and relatively small capital market. 
Policy designers responsible for 
implementing privatization plans in 
WKHIXWXUHFDQEHQHÀWIURPWKHKLV-
torical background of privatization 
experiences in that country. 
Previous studies have focused on the 
&KLOHDQSULYDWL]DWLRQ ,32·V SHUIRU-
mance as part of a larger sample of 
,32V)RUH[DPSOHWKHVWXG\RI$J-
garwal et al. (1993) develops a com-
prehensive study for Latin American 
,32V LQFOXGLQJ ERWK SULYDWL]DWLRQ
DQGQRUPDO,32V+RZHYHULQWKHLU
study, they do not describe the way 
LQZKLFKSULYDWL]DWLRQ LVVXHV· RIIHU
prices were determined nor do they 
tell how they selected the data to 
PDNH WKHLU SULYDWL]DWLRQ ,32VSHU-
formance analysis. 
7KHPDLQÀQGLQJVRI WKLVVWXG\DV
explained above, are that Chilean 
SULYDWL]DWLRQ ,32V ZHUH LPSOH-
mented through a large number of 
small block trades, under a public 
auction mechanism, that resulted in 
many different prices for successive 
transactions during the placement 
process, thus invalidating many of 
the common theoretical explanations 
RI,32VXQGHUSULFLQJDQGGHPDQGLQJ
D FDUHIXO LGHQWLÀFDWLRQ RI WKH WUXH
initial quotes for the issues.
30  See, for example, Hachette and Lüders (1994) and Alé et al. (1990).
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